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OPTIONS FOR US-INDIA RELATIONS

The past 20 years have seen a great deal
of progress in the US-India relationship. The
non-aligned status of the Indian
Government during the Cold War, and the
US’s relationship with Pakistan, precluded a
close partnership between the two
countries, even if they shared similar
political systems. The end of the Cold War
brought new opportunities for the two democratic giants, as India
liberalized its economic and trade policies and US presidents,
starting with Bill Clinton, began to court the mercurial Asian
power. President George W. Bush continued to develop the
relationship by widening trade ties, making exceptions for India’s
nuclear program through a more understanding interpretation of
India’s place in American non-proliferation policy, and through an
increase in defense ties that is beginning to truly bear fruit. The
Obama Administration has continued to encourage strong
diplomatic ties with the Indian state through its open and
functional support of Indian efforts to secure a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council and highly publicized
bilateral initiatives and state visits. The relationship has continued
to thrive amidst diplomatic impasses, economic stagnation, and
political uncertainty.
While the US-India relationship continues to develop on all
fronts, the changing dynamics of global and regional relative power
have increasingly highlighted the importance of India to the US’s
foreign policy in Asia. With the new Indian Prime Minister,
Narendra Modi, comes an opening for progress and innovation in
US-Indian relations, in which an increase in economic and defense
ties could act as a safeguard for the maintenance of the current
regional order in Asia and, by extension, the global order
implemented after the Second World War. In pursuit of a much
closer relationship with India, the United States can approach the
opportunity through many different long-term strategies, but
questions concerning the formality of the relationship will
consistently color the debate. Before the US and India can continue
to develop ties, there must be a general framework that informs the
nature of the relationship and the logic of its political and legal
elements. In order to move forward in this vein, current and
subsequent American presidential administrations must decide
whether they want an informal partnership with India built on
shared political values and regional interests, a relationship based
on the codified aspects of bilateral and multilateral institutions and
treaties, or a hybrid model, combining both legalistic and informal
connections.

A FLEXIBLE RELATIONSHIP
Here, the United States could continue to expand its de facto
defense and economic ties with the Indian government and

encourage a melding of the two countries’ private sectors by
actively lobbying for the removal of bi-lateral trade barriers. The
US-India relationship has many inherent qualities that foster
increased development of national connections without the
formality of treaties and institutional overlays. In terms of informal
defense ties, arms sales and limited technology transfers would
feature heavily in the US-India security relationship. Sales of US
weapons to India grew from $237 million in 2009 to $2 Billion in
2013, surpassing Russia’s arms trade with India for the first time. In
addition to arms sales, the Indian military conducts more military
exercises with the United States than any other country. While
these developments illustrate strengthening security ties between
the two nations, they do not explicitly bind American foreign policy
to that of India’s in the case of a regional conflict. Although, it does
send a clear message to potential aggressors that the United States
includes the South Asian giant in the calculations of its AsianPacific interests.
US defense ties to India also, in their current state, illustrate
that American support of Indian security interests goes beyond
rhetoric, but is not set in stone, thus providing the US government
the opportunity to conduct a flexible national security policy. In
keeping with this policy, arms sales and stipulated technology
transfers should take precedence over formal ties like the Defense
Framework Agreement, renewed this summer for an additional 10
years. Economic relations should also maintain an informal quality,
given the fact that Indian domestic interests don’t always suit the
objectives of the American business community and are, at times,
seemingly downright hostile to US efforts to encourage
development.
For example, the 2005 civil nuclear agreement has been stuck
in somewhat of a holding pattern since the introduction of more
stringent Indian liability laws. American companies are unwilling
to invest and the economic opportunity afforded to the Indian state
by the US deviation from its nuclear non-proliferation policies has
been heretofore squandered. This is, of course, illustrative of the
types of issues that come up in the relations of two democratic
nations with complex domestic political systems that can often
prove to make the alignment of priorities difficult, especially when
the perceived welfare of their respective citizenry is involved.
Nurturing an informal economic relationship, outside of trade
treaties and multilateral trade agreements, gives the US options in
how it approaches its economic relationship with India – which has
been quite fruitful as a whole for US corporations – while giving
both parties the ability to modify it in ways they deem fit.

FULL COMMITMENT
In this case, the US would actively pursue a
formalization of all aspects of the U.S.-Indian relationship,
across security and economic ties. This would allow for the
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most expedient and meticulous promotion of a binding
relationship between the two nations, and begin to codify an
affiliation that could transform the geopolitical and economic
direction of Asia in the 21st century. The consummation of this
relationship lies in bilateral and multilateral agreements and
treaties that would improve the strategic standing of both
countries through increased cooperation in the areas of defense
and trade. In formalizing the defense ties between India and the
U.S., the first order of business has already been carried out, the
renewal of the Defense Framework Agreement, which has been
partially responsible for the enormous increase in US arms sales
to India, and an impetus for the discussion of increased defense
technology transfer and joint development. This agreement will
include stepping up military-to-military contact at senior levels,
collaboration on the orientation of joint communications and
logistics, and joint strategic planning.
While US-Indian cooperative statements on issues like
terrorism and the South China Sea are productive and send a
message about the stance of the two nations on important
contemporary security issues, the provision of a legal status to the
US-Indian defense relationship creates opportunities for
projecting their respective national security interests into the
future. It will not only provide an environment for the long-term
strategy and operational planning of both the US and Indian
national security establishments, but may also provide a solid
context within which potential systemic usurpers may consider
the increased costs of upsetting the international order.
Formal security relationships make economic integration
necessary, not just because of the implications for the efficiency of
future activations of those security agreements, but also through
fostering the long-term economic growth and cultural exchanges
that accompany intensive trade relationships. These connections,
outside of being lucrative in the absolute sense, then strengthen
the agreements themselves through shared experience and mutual
benefit. With this in mind, the US should work with the Indian
government to conclude the bilateral investment treaty that has
been on hold for over 10 years and look towards overcoming the
obstacles to a bilateral free trade agreement.

MIX AND MATCH
The US could consider a combination of the two policies
mentioned above, mixing and matching the formal and informal trade
and security relationship with India as it deems fit for the national
security and economic interests of the country. An informal trade
policy with formal security ties to India will allow for a united Asian
front to form without sacrificing additional diplomatic and political
capital. The lack of formal economic ties will also spare both the US
and Indian markets from unforeseen problems that could harm
economic growth or good relations in general. Of course, formal allies
that are economically linked might be better prepared for the
complex resource sharing and coordinated production that makes a
combined war effort easier to prosecute. In considering
heterogeneous policy combinations, the pairing of formal trade links
with an informal security partnership might make the most sense of
the two combinations. This would create the opportunity for a
melding of economic and political interests between the U.S. and
India, while maintain strategic flexibility for both nations.

SHAPING FUTURE ENDEAVORS

The formal model would best suit the future geopolitical and
economic interests of the United States and India. Formal trade and
security links between the US and India will begin a process that
has been made necessary by an increasingly complex international
environment. A strong and legalistic US-Indian relationship will
leave no doubt about the orientation of regional and global forces
when it comes to the maintenance of the current order. It will
manufacture the types of red-lines that send important signals to
those who might test the structural integrity of that system. A
codified security relationship, without sufficient economic ties,
would be functionally weak. While there is a much stronger case to
be made for the opposite configuration, the lack of a security
element would preclude preparations to defend the mutual
economic interests which would form in such a trade relationship
between the US and India. A serious military threat to one country
in this scenario would probably bring in the other nation anyways,
given their closely associated economies

